Shultz, Stanley K. “World War II: The Impact at Home”. June 1990. University of Wisconsin. 19 April 2006. http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/lectures/lecture21.html

• “patriotism soared in American society. Americans' willingness to carry out blackout and civil defense drills; to recycle metals, paper, and even cooking fats; to work longer hours, but to have fewer consumer goods to buy with their salaries demonstrated the nation's strong support for the war.”
• “There were political changes as well, as the country began to shift to the right. This lecture examines the domestic side of World War II and the changes that took place in American society during the war.”
• “The wartime economy brought about full employment and, in doing so, achieved what New Deal programs had been unable to do. In 1940, there were  8 million Americans unemployed. By 1941, however, unemployment was almost unheard of. There were actually labor shortages in some industries. As a result, more and more women entered the workforce. Women took up jobs in industry that had once been reserved for men, and "Rosie the Riveter" became a popular American icon. By 1945, women made up 36% of the nation's total workforce.”

“Mobilization of the Homefront”. March 1999. Internet. 19 April 2006. http://history.acusd.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/mobilization99.html

• “After Pearl Harbor, the Defense program was replaced by the Victory program. "Its three central targets were planes, tanks, and merchant shipping."Although the 77th Congress "was probably the most despised political body in twentieth-century American history" it gave FDR "the power to reorganize government agencies, establish censorship, seize alien-owned property and award contracts without competitive bidding." The federal government "was growing at a rate and on a scale that eclipsed even the headiest New Deal days." Much of this growth was welcome. "Most sensitive of all, however, was the matter of domestic propaganda.”
• “The U.S. war production increased, but consumer production continued. The U.S. never fully mobilized the economy and FDR remained the "broker" president. The military-industrial complex becam more powerful and civil liberties suffered. Liberal reforms failed to rise above conservative priorities, waste and poor management. War agencies were regarded as strictly temporary and many things returned to pre-war status after 1945.”
• 

“Mobilization: The U.S. Army in World War II”. January 1996. Internet. 19 April 2006. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/mobpam.htm

• “In response to these difficulties, President Wilson established the War Industries Board in July 1917. This board eventually under Bernard M. Baruch, coordinated purchasing by agencies of the Army and Navy and fixed production priorities. Other agencies tended to act in concert with the board's allocation decisions. The Fuel Administration, for example, looked to the board for mining machinery and the priorities on which it shipped coal. The armed services also depended on the board submitting their needs for scarce items to determine allocations and transportation priorities.”
• “The centralized determination of priorities under the board facilitated logistical consolidation within the War Department, with Maj. Gen. George W. Goethals of Panama Canal fame in charge. The process forced the Army to settle its own questions of priority before dealing with the board. After the bureaus resolved their internal priorities, they sent their requests to the Army priorities officer in Goethals' Purchase, Traffic, and Storage Division.”
• “Still unclear was the nation's willingness to learn the war's lessons about preparedness. It was plain that the materiel side of mobilization was the most costly, complex, and time consuming. The war, Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell said had "upset the previous opinion that adequate military preparedness is largely a question of trained manpower.”

“The Good War?” December 2002. Internet. 19 April 2006. http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/WW2Timeline/goodwar.html

• wages increased as 15 million left private sector for military sector. Personal income rose from $72 billion in 1939 to $172 billion in 1945, a real growth rate adjested for inflation of 68% in 6 years
• redistribution of income, from pyramidal structure of 1939 that showed top 5% of population earning 30% national income, to more even structure of 1945 that showed top 5 % earning 18%, with large shifts from lower incomes to middle incomes, with 53% population earning more than $3000
• the economy became a "military-industrial complex" dependent on government defense programs, prone to corruption and profiteering without oversight or regulation

Elliott, Harriet. “Price and Supply on the Home Front”. Internet. 19 April 2006. http://newdeal.feri.org/survey/sg41394.htm

• “Greatly increased demand for food—growing out of increased consumer purchasing power, army needs, and shipments under the Lease-Lend program—have been pushing food prices up. Efforts to achieve parity prices for farmers have added to the upward trend. It is our policy, however, that these prices shall be held within bounds.”
• “Every increase in food prices places a burden on the low income consumer. The food price increases occurring at the present time constitute a burden which must be lightened by redoubled efforts to make possible wise buying, assist consumers to know and use the less expensive foods, and to promote special programs which put food of high nutritive value within reach of low income families. Increased food prices make particularly significant the program for enriching the staple, low cost foods. They make imperative the much wider use of quality standards and grades to enable consumers to compare products, stretch their food pennies, and make their food purchases fit their needs.”
• “Price itself is meaningless without quality. Price controls cannot be administered unless a price applies to a specific quality.”

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